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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the details of the income tax filing system
affect taxpayers’ reporting behaviour. More specifically, we analyse the effects of the
introduction of prefilled tax returns on income tax reporting. We utilise a policy
experiment that took place in Finland in the mid-1990s, whereby a proportion of
taxpayers received a partially prefilled income tax return, whereas other taxpayers had
to file a full return (the normal practice). For those who received a prefilled return,
items such as labour income had been prefilled based on information received from
third parties such as employers. These individuals were required to file a final return
only if some income information was incorrect or missing and had the option of filing
a return e.g. in case they wanted to file for some discretionary deductions. Due to
the nature of the rules that determined inclusion of individuals into the experiment,
we are able to estimate the causal effect of the income tax filing system on taxpayers’
reporting behaviour.
Beyond evaluating the effects of this particular reform, the evidence that we find
is likely to be of interest for policy in other countries. Prefilled income tax returns
are the current practice in many countries, and their use has been proposed and/or
experimented with in others,1 yet no systematic evidence exists on their effects on tax
reporting.2 One advantage of a shift to prefilled tax returns are savings in tax prepa-
ration costs (Goolsbee 2006). In addition to such direct cost savings, it is important
to know how taxpayers’ reporting behaviour would be affected. Reporting behaviour
may be affected if the reform changes the costs of reporting, the likelihood of honest
mistakes in reporting (e.g. due to complexity or salience effects), or possibilities for
tax evasion. Any changes in reporting behaviour may naturally have an effect on tax
revenues as well as the take-home pay of individual taxpayers.
We analyse how the reform affected reporting on five types of items: (i) prefilled
income (income from primary and secondary jobs), (ii) non-prefilled income (other
earned income and capital income), (iii) prefilled deductions (mortgage interest deduc-
1In a survey of revenue bodies in 56 advanced and emerging economies (including all OECD, EU,
and G20 members), almost a half of revenue bodies reported using at least some degree of prefilling
(OECD 2015, 256). For an account of an experiment with return-free filing in Callifornia, see Bankman
(2005).
2Gillitzer and Skov (2013) show that the introduction of third party reporting and prefilling lead
to an increase in the number of individuals claiming for charitable contributions in Denmark. Alm
et al. (2010) conducted a laboratory experiment where they found that when subjects were provided
information on their true tax liability, this had a positive impact on reporting. The treatment in
the Alm et al. experiment can be thought of as having analogies with third party information and
prefilling.
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tion in 1997); (iv) non-prefilled deductions (e.g. costs of travel to work and other costs
for acquiring income); and (v) reported wealth (which was non-prefilled for all tax-
payers)3. This classification covers all items on an individual’s income tax return. We
find most pronounced effects for non-prefilled deductions, where receiving a partially
prefilled return caused a significant reduction in claims. The effect is large, amounting
to an over 1/4 drop in the number of individuals claiming for such discretionary de-
ductions. On the other hand, for deductions that were prefilled, there was an increase
(albeit smaller) in the number of claims. For non-prefilled income items, there was a
fairly small but statistically significant drop in reporting; similarly, there was a drop
in reported wealth, which was also not prefilled. For prefilled income items, there was
no change in reporting.
Finally, we have estimated the effect of receiving a prefilled tax return on individu-
als’ total taxable income and taxes paid and the reform appears to have had no effects
on these aggregate measures. These results are significant for an overall evaluation of
the reform. To the extent that taxable income is a sufficient statistic for welfare (net
of compliance costs and tax administration costs), the results would point towards the
conclusion that prefilled tax returns appear to be a good idea4: the reform implied no
adverse effects on taxable income, but at the same time it implied a reduction in the
costs of compliance and administration.5
In addition to assessing the desirability of prefilled tax forms, our results provide
interesting insights on taxpayers’ filing behaviour. A key feature of our results is
that receiving a partially prefilled return leads to a tendency to report less of those
items (both positive income items and deductions) that are not prefilled and more of
those that are. Potential explanations for our findings are likely to be related to the
complexity of the tax system and the associated costs of filing a tax return and/or
claiming for individual items, as well as salience effects. We also discuss whether
changes in tax evasion may explain our results, and conclude that changes in the
opportunities for tax evasion may be a partial explanation for some findings, but is
very unlikely to be the whole story.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some theoretical con-
siderations related to why and how the details of the income tax filing system might
3At that time, wealth (above a certain limit) was taxable in Finland.
4The conclusion could potentially be qualified if there were significant adverse effects on the income
distribution (see the Results section for a preliminary discussion).
5According to Goolsbee (2006), a scheme with ”Simple Returns”, where prefilled tax returns would
be sent to U.S. taxpayers with sufficiently simple finances, could save up to 225 million hours of tax
compliance time and more than $2 billion a year in tax preparation fees.
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affect reporting behaviour. In Section 3, we describe the Finnish experiment involving
prefilled income tax returns. The data and methodology are described in Section 4.
Our preliminary results are presented in Section 5 and the possible explanations for
our findings are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
Why would the details of the income tax filing system matter for reporting behaviour?
In this Section, we outline a simple reporting model to provide a framework for un-
derstanding the possible mechanisms involved. In the model, individuals weigh the
benefits and costs of truthful reporting, taking into account the likelihood of getting
caught with tax evasion, as in the classical deterrence model of tax evasion (Allignham
and Sandmo, 1972). As in Kleven et al. (2011), the probability of getting caught may
differ across different types of income items. Further, we stress that it is the perceived
probability of detection that matters for the incentive to report truthfully, and the per-
ceived probability may depend on the extent of prefilling. We also incorporate the idea
that individuals may make honest mistakes in reporting. The particular type of mis-
take that we consider is that individuals may not be aware of the obligation to report
a given item, or the right to claim for a given deduction; such incomplete awareness is
related to the idea of tax salience (e.g. Chetty et al. 2009).
We consider two margins on which reporting decisions are made: the individual
decides whether or not to file a return, as well as whether or not to report an individual
item, conditional on filing. Previous work on tax compliance concentrates almost
exclusively on the intensive margin of reporting (i.e. considering the amount of income
to report, and not whether or not to report at all); exceptions include Pitt and Slemrod
(1989), Slemrod (1989) and Erard and Ho (2001). Due to possible fixed costs of
reporting (see below), when considering deduction claims for example, the extensive
margin of reporting is likely to be at least as important as the continuous choice of how
much to report. For simplicity, we assume that the individual either does not report
an item at all or reports the true amount on that item. (Considering also the amount
how much to report on a given item would add a third margin, and would complicate
the analysis without providing important new insights in the present context.)
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2.1 Model
Reporting individual items We consider four types of items on the tax return:
prefilled and non-prefilled income items (positive income items) and prefilled and non-
prefilled deductions (negative income items).6 Clearly, the prefilled items are prefilled
only for those individuals who receive a partially prefilled return, but for sake of con-
sistency we use the same categorisation of items for all individuals.
We assume that the individual is risk neutral and all income is subject to a linear
income tax rate. We consider a discrete choice of whether a given item is reported or
not. An individual item is reported if
sPi NBi > 0, (1)
where NBi is the expected net benefit of reporting item i. and s
P
i is the ex post salience
parameter that is equal to 1 if the individual is aware of his eligibility for the item or
requirement to report it, and zero otherwise. ”Ex post” refers to the fact that when
reporting individual items, the taxpayer has already incurred the fixed cost of filing
(e.g. studying the information material - see below) and salience of different items
may have changed (increased) as a result. (In the simplest case we might assume that
sPi = 1 for all items.) Clearly, if s
P
i = 0, the individual is not aware of the item and
does not report it.
It is important to note that reporting here in practice refers to making amendments
to the tax return. For individuals who receive an empty return, the default on a given
item is zero, wheras for individuals who receive a partially prefilled return, the default is
given by the information printed on the form. The reporting decision is determined by
(1) regardless of whether the individual receives a prefilled form or not, since amending
a prefilled item is in practice identical to filling the same item on an empty form. The
parameter values in (1) may however differ between the different cases, depending on
whether the individual receives a partially pre-filled form or not, and on whether the
given item is prefilled. (More on this below and in Section 2.2, where we discuss the
predictions from the model.)
For positive income items we have
NBi = [(1− τ)mi − ki]− [(1− p˜i (ϕi, ϕ))mi + p˜i (ϕi, ϕ) (1− τ (1 + θ))mi] , (2)
where the terms inside the first square brackets correspond to income from item i if
6In the empirical part, we also consider effects on reported wealth.
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the item is reported, and the second square brackets to expected income if the item
is not reported. τ is the linear income tax rate, mi is the amount of income on item
i (measured as the difference to the default - either zero or the prefilled amount -
since the benefits of reporting relate to the amount by which the individual’s reported
income differs from the default); and ki is the (financial or mental) cost of reporting
item i. Further, p˜i (ϕi, ϕ) is the perceived probability that evasion is detected on item
i, which may depend on whether the individual received a prefilled income tax return
(ϕ = 1; zero otherwise) and whether the given item is prefilled (ϕi = 1; zero otherwise).
Finally, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the fine associated with evasion, that is, the fraction of owed tax
payments that needs to be paid as a fine if caught with tax evasion. Given (1) and (2),
a positive income item is reported if
sPi [(1 + θ) (p˜i (ϕi, ϕ)− 1) · τmi − ki] > 0. (3)
In the case of deductions, the individual has incurred expenses that may be deducted
from taxable income, i.e. there is a possible tax saving (at rate τ) associated with filing
for deductions. For deductions (negative income items), the expected net benefit of
reporting an item is given by
NBi = [− (1− ei) (1− τ)mi + ei (−p˜i (ϕi, ϕ) θτmi + (1− p˜i (ϕi, ϕ)) τmi)− ki]−[− (1− ei)mi] ,
(4)
where the terms inside the first square brackets again give the income from item i if
the item is reported, and the last term corresponds to the case when the item is not
reported. The parameter ei = 1 if the negative income item is illegitimate (a form
of evasion), and zero if it is legitimate (the expenses claimed actually took place). In
the case an individual is caught with an illegitimate claim, the fine is again equal to a
fraction of the owed tax payments, i.e. θτmi.
7 Given (1) and (4), a deduction item is
then reported if8
sPi [− ((1 + θ) eip˜i (ϕi, ϕ)− 1) · τmi − ki] > 0. (5)
7The assumption that mi is exogenous may seem problematic in the case of illegitimate items. One
might then think of mi as corresponding to some ”typical” value of a particular deduction. E.g. in
the case of trade union membership fees that are tax deductible, a taxpayer may consider deducting
such fees even if not belonging to a trade union; the claim would then be illegitimate but mi would
nevertheless be well defined.
8The same condition can also be derived by noting that the benefit of reporting a given item relate
to the associated tax savings, equal to (1− eip˜i (ϕi, ϕ)) τmi; and the costs relate to the penalty if
caught on repoting an illegitimate item, and are equal to eip˜i (ϕi, ϕ) θτmi + ki. The item is then
reported if the benefit of doing so is larger than the cost.
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The filing decision. Prior to deciding whether or not to report individual items,
individuals need to decide whether or not to file in the first place. Individuals who did
not receive a prefilled form had to file a complete return, whereas for individuals who
received a pre-filled form, filing means making some amendments to the pre-filled form
(either entering information that was missing from the form, or making corrections to
some of the pre-filled items).
Assume that there is a fixed cost of filing, K and there may also be a (possibly
probabilistic) fine F for not filing. The individual chooses to file if
∑
sAi NBi · I (NBi > 0)−K > F, (6)
where I (.) is the indicator function and takes into account the fact that only those
items where NBi > 0 will end up being reported in case the individual chooses to file.
The ex ante salience parameter sAi is equal to 1 if the individual is aware of his eligibility
for the item / requirement to report it (prior to e.g. studying any information material
associated with tax filing), and zero otherwise. It is natural to assume that sAi ≤ sPi
i.e. studying the information material can only increase the individual’s awareness of
the (costs and benefits) of reporting different items.
It is important to note that for individuals who received a prefilled return, F = 0
i.e. they were not required to file a return.9 On the other hand, for individuals who
did not receive a prefilled return, we may assume for simplicity that F is prohibitively
high, that is in practice all individuals in the old system had to file a return.10
2.2 Predictions
Complexity and the costs of reporting A key cost component is likely to be the
fixed cost of filing a tax return, K. The tax system as well as the tax return form
itself are highly complex, and there may be significant fixed costs related to learning
the details of the system, studying the instructions material provided etc, in order
to report one’s income correctly for tax purposes.11 Those who are required to file a
9Those who received a prefilled return were only required to file if some income information on
particular items on the tax form was incorrect or missing, in which case they would face a penalty for
not reporting that particular item; the fine θ (see above) would then be applicable.
10This is a simplifying assumption that is strictly speaking not required for our results; what we
would need is that for those who received a non-prefilled return, F >> 0 i.e. they are much more
likely to file a return than individuals who received a prefilled form.
11The fixed cost of filing taxes may also be related to the negative psychological emotions associated
with having to think about taxation or complex tasks in general. In Finland, individual taxpayers
very rarely use tax preparer services.
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complete income tax return have no choice but to incur these fixed costs (as we have
assumed that F is prohibitively high for them). On the other hand, those who receive
a prefilled return, may choose to avoid these costs. Therefore, in the case of receiving
a partially prefilled return, if the expected gain from filing is smaller than the fixed
cost of filing, the individual will not file.
In addition to the fixed cost of filing a return, there may be costs associated with
reporting any individual item on the tax return, denoted above by ki.
12 A key com-
ponent here is likely to be the opportunity cost of time spent on activities related to
reporting, in particular calculating the correct figure to report on each item.13 The
opportunity cost of time is likely to be convex: it is fairly easy to find a small amount
of time for any particular activity, but since there is only a fixed number of hours
in a day, additional time units become increasingly costly. Many items were prefilled
for those individuals who received a prepopulated tax return. Therefore, considering
possible effects on reporting any discretionary items, a convex opportunity cost of time
(ki increasing when more items are reported) would point towards individuals who
received a prepopulated return filing for more such items, as compared to individuals
who had to file a complete return.
Taking together the two lines of argument related to costs of reporting, a taxfiler’s
cost function (as a function of the number of items reported n, assuming here for
simplicity that sAi = 1), given by C (n) = K +
n∑
i
ki, may first be concave and then
convex: there may be a fixed cost related to learning the details of a complex tax
system, but thereafter the function may be convex due to convex opportunity costs
of time. Therefore the effect of receiving a prefilled tax return on reporting of any
discretionary items such as deductions, based on these arguments, is unclear a priori.
If the fixed complexity costs are prominent, we would expect them to dominate over
the variable costs, and would expect to see a reduction in reporting any non-prefilled
items. On the other hand, for items that are prefilled in the prepopulated tax return,
one would expect to see an increase in the number of people claiming a positive amount:
again, for individuals who receive an empty return, the default on a given item is zero,
wheras for individuals who receive a partially prefilled return, the default is given by
the information prefilled by the tax authority. Therefore, for prefilled items, there is no
12See Pitt and Slemrod (1989) for evidence on the cost of itemising deductions in the U.S.
13There were no significant differences in any physical costs incurred by individuals subject to the
two different systems of tax filing. Making adjustments to the pre-filled tax return was in practice
identical to reporting similar items in the old system. Also other rules e.g. regarding retaining receipts
related to deduction claims were identical across the two systems.
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cost associated with reporting the prefilled amount (as this is the amount that prevails
if the taxpayer does nothing); the costs of reporting are in this case associated with
changing the information that is prefilled by the tax authority.
All in all, fixed cost of reporting therefore create a bias towards the status quo:
filing more of those items that are prefilled on the tax return, and less of those that
are not.
Salience Receiving a prefilled tax return might also affect reporting behaviour through
salience effects. Recent findings in the literature on behavioural public economics (see
e.g. Congdon et al. 2011) indicate that individuals may be less than fully attentive
to taxes. In general, tax salience refers to the degree of visibility of taxation (see e.g.
Chetty, Looney and Kroft 2009, Finkelstein 2009). Previous literature on tax salience
has been concerned with the visibility of tax rates (or tax inclusive prices), whereas we
refer to the visibility of other parts of the tax code, namely individuals’ awareness of
particular tax items.14
In our case, individuals who received a prefilled tax return in most cases did not
have to take any action to comply with their legal duties as taxpayers, whereas other
individuals were required by law to fill out a tax return. This may have made some
features of the income tax system more visible for them, i.e. they might have learned
about the existence of some (non-prefilled) items that they would otherwise have been
unaware of. For individuals who receive an empty return, only condition (1) and
therefore only sPi is relevant. On the other hand, for individuals who receive a prefilled
return also an extra condition, namely (6), has to be satisfied. Given this condition
and sAi ≤ sPi , salience effects would unambiguously lead to a reduction in reporting a
positive amount on both positive and negative non-prefilled income items.
Simliarly to the costs of reporting, salience effects lead to a bias towards the status
quo in income tax reporting. Whereas the arguments related to costs of reporting
would assume reporting decisions to be the result of a rational cost-benefit calculus,
salience effects may imply that an individual may neglect the obligation / possibility
to report some items altogether, in which case his/her reporting decisions would not
be the result of optimising behaviour.
14Further, whereas the previous literature is mostly concerned with the effects of salience on real
behaviour such as consumption (Chetty, Looney and Kroft 2009) and labour supply decisions (e.g.
Chetty and Saez 2013), we are in the current paper interested in the effects of salience on reporting
behaviour.
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Opportunities for tax evasion A third line of argument is related to the oppor-
tunities for tax evasion. The perceived probability that evasion is detected is a key
determinant of the extent of evasion, as it affects the expected costs of evasion: The
higher the probability of detection, the lower is the extent of tax evasion. As shown by
expressions (3) and (5) above, a higher probability of detection would obviously lead
to a higher likelyhood of reporting a positive amount on positive income items and a
lower likelihood of claiming for deductions (assuming that some deduction claims may
be illegitimate).
In recent literature, it has become apparent that audit probability is not a good
proxy for the probability of detection. For example, Kleven et al. (2011) and Slem-
rod (2007) stress the importance of third-party reporting: the authorities receive in-
formation on certain income items also from third parties (e.g. regular wages from
employers), and the probability of detection is higher on these items (e.g. due to the
possibility of computerised cross-checking of information) and the opportunities for
evasion correspondingly lower, than on items not subject to third-party reporting.
In our case, the information available to the tax authorities was the same in both
systems, and the actual detection probability does not depend on whether the third
party information is prefilled or not. Nevertheless, the perceived probability of detection
may be affected by prefilling. One possibility is then the following:
p˜i (1, 1) ≥ p˜i (0, 1) ≥ p˜i (0, 0) . (7)
That is, receiving a prepopulated return would increase the perceived probability of
detection, but more so for those items that are actually prefilled on the form. The
second inequality follows from possible spillovers to other items: Receiving a prefilled
form makes the individuals realise that the tax authorities have some information on
their income, and they may be worried that this information may extend beyond what
is printed on the form. If (7) holds, receiving a partially prefilled form would reduce
evasion across the board.
On the other hand, we conjecture that another possibility is that
p˜i (1, 1) ≥ p˜i (0, 0) ≥ p˜i (0, 1) , (8)
that is, receiving a partially prefilled form increases the perceived detection proba-
bility only for those items that are actually prefilled on the form, and reduces it for
other items. The story would go as follows: upon receiving a prepopulated return, the
individual realises that the tax authority holds some information on his/her income,
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but assumes that the authorities would have printed all their information on the form,
and that it is therefore safe to evade income on other items. If this were the case,
then receiving a partially prefilled form would reduce evasion on those items that are
prefilled, but increase evasion on other items.
Putting together the three lines of argument outlined above, one may think of a
broad notion of tax compliance, defined in terms of the accuracy of reporting and
taking into account both under- and over-reporting. Such a notion would encompass
all three mechanisms discussed above: First, costs of reporting may naturally reduce
the accuracy of reporting. Second, (incomplete) salience points to the possibility of
honest mistakes and omissions in reporting. Third, tax evasion refers to a particular
type of non-compliance, namely the case of willful underreporting. Compliance costs
and honest mistakes in reporting may lead not only to underreporting, but also to
overreporting (e.g. due to unclaimed deductions). This phenomenon is typically not
detected in audit experiments, such as in Kleven et al. (2011), where the focus naturally
is on detecting underreporting (see also Gillitzer and Skov 2013). In our setting, it may
be possible to detect evidence of both over- and underreporting.
3 The experiment
The paper utilises data from the so called Finnish tax proposal experiment implemented
between 1995 and 2004. During the experiment, a proportion of non-entrepreneur
taxpayers did not have to file a return, but instead received a prefilled return (”tax
proposal”) where their tax liability had been calculated based on third-party reports
(e.g. wage income reported by employers and transfers reported by benefit agencies)
and other relevant information available to the government. The main objective of
moving to a system with prefilled income tax returns was to save on tax filing ex-
penses, even though it was also mentioned that the accuracy of reporting should not
be compromised.
Those individuals who had to file a complete return, say for 1995, were required to
do so by the end of January 1996. Those individuals who had been selected into the
experiment were notified of this in mid-January. The prepopulated return was sent to
them in late May and they had until mid-June to submit their corrections. If they did
not do so, the tax authorities’ original proposal was implemented.
A key piece of information for our purposes are the rules that determined a tax-
payer’s inclusion into the experiment. There were differences in inclusion criteria be-
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tween groups of municipalities: different municipalities used different selection models,
whereby both the number and types of individuals included into the experiment varied
across municipalities. Within each model, individuals were selected according to vari-
ables such as age, income, lagged deductions and wealth holdings.15 The rules created
variation in treatment status across individuals, depending on where the individual
lived. The purpose of the selection models was to first start off the experiment with
a modest number of taxpayers with relatively simple tax returns; and then to expand
the experiment so that more and more of different kinds of taxpayers became treated
in subsequent years.
The experiment started in 1995 with approximately 300 000 individuals (7 % of
taxpayers) receiving a prefilled return. In the first year of the experiment, there were
four different selection models used: the most restrictive model was one where only
pensioners and young individuals with low earned income in a given municipality were
included in the experiment; and the most inclusive model involved all regular taxpay-
ers in a given municipality. The other two selection models were between these two
extremes in the share of individuals selected: the models involved regular wage earners
in a given municipality, and differed in the exact details of the selection rules. One of
the above four models was implemented in 9.8 % out of the 439 municipalities16.
In subsequent years, the number of participating individuals increased each year,
through two channels: The experiment was extended into new municipalities, and the
selection models were changed (usually) to include more taxpayers in a given munic-
ipality. The selection models became increasingly complex over time.17 The number
of individuals who received a prefilled return each year is reported in Table 1. Today
most regular, non-entrepreneur taxpayers receive a prefilled return.
15Inclusion into the experiment depended on one’s own and one’s spouse’s information, as both
spouses were always part of the same reporting regime: Individuals whose spouse was not eligible to
receive a prepopulated return would not receive one either.
16Our data excludes the 16 municipalities in the autonomous island of A˚land.
17In the most complex model, selection depended on the previous year values of approximately 70
variables, and also in other models selection often depended on dozens of variables.
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Table 1. Number of taxpayers receiving a prefilled return.
Year prefilled return Normal return Total % prefilled
1995 303,981 3,819,187 4,123,168 7.4
1996 1,325,855 2,813,613 4,139,468 32.0
1997 2,367,027 1,797,996 4,165,023 56.8
1998 2,299,431 1,884,912 4,184,343 55.0
1999 2,850,301 1,359,241 4,209,542 67.7
2000 2,864,301 1,369,787 4,234,088 67.6
2001 2,875,631 1,378,058 4,253,689 67.6
2002 2,920,112 1,359,233 4,279,345 68.2
2003 2,947,364 1,352,664 4,300,028 68.5
2004 2,950,826 1,365,848 4,316,674 68.4
Since our identification strategy (see section 4) is partly based on geographical
variation in the implementation of the experiment, an important piece of information
relates to how decisions were made regarding which selection model to use in each
municipality. At the time, Finland was divided into 10 tax office areas that were in
turn divided into a total of 93 tax districts. There were altogether 455 municipalities in
1995, and each municipality belonged into one tax district. When the experiment was
launched, each tax office chose one or sometimes two default selection models that were
applied to the tax districts within that tax office area. Before making a final decision
on the models to be applied to each district and municipality, the tax offices were able
to apply the different models to data from previous years’ tax collection, to examine for
example how many taxpayers would be selected from each municipality under any given
model. Some municipalities and districts were then subject to exceptions, meaning that
some other model than the default model of their tax office area was finally applied
to that municipality/district. The main reason for such exceptions was to include a
sufficient number of taxpayers into the experiment.18 Therefore, while not completely
random, the selection of municipalities into the experiment appears unrelated to our
outcomes of interest (e.g. expected future trends in deduction claims or reported
income), and therefore does not interfere with our identification strategy. Identification
will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
18It is also important to note that the tax offices are independent entities whose purpose is to
ensure efficient and accurate tax collection, and their functions are unrelated to municipal politics,
for example.
13
4 Data and methodology
Our analysis is based on two data sources. First, we have obtained detailed docu-
mentation of the experiment from the tax authorities. Notably, this includes detailed
information on the criteria based on which individuals were selected into the experi-
ment each year. This information is crucial for our identification strategy. Second, for
carrying out the main part of the analysis, we use individual level data on a represen-
tative panel (20 %) of Finnish non-entrepreneur taxpayers (and their spouses) from
Statistics Finland’s tax register for 1993-1997. Altogether, there are approximately 1
million individuals in the data, and we follow them over the entire period. The data
covers all variables contained in the tax register: there is information on various forms
of income as well as tax payments (for example labour income, capital income, trans-
fers, asset holdings, debt, taxes paid, very detailed information on various types of
deductions), as well as background information (age, gender, marital status, place of
residence, level of education).
In the analysis, we look at the effects of receiving a prefilled return for the first
time. We utilise data from the first three years of the experiment (1995-7), when the
experiment expanded considerably from covering 7% of regular taxpayers in 1995 to
covering 57 % of taxpayers in 1997 - see Table 1.19 We pool the data for the three
years in all regressions. The outcome variables are formed by classifying all items in
the tax return into five categories, and our analysis therefore provides a full analysis of
the effects of introducing prepopulated tax returns on income tax reporting. The first
three categories consist of positive income items and wealth, and the last two cover
deduction items:
(i) Prefilled income: This category consists of income from primary and secondary
jobs.
(ii) Non-prefilled income: This category consists of other (self-reported) earned
income and capital income. Capital income includes dividends, rental income, capital
gains and interest income, and other smaller items.20
19Analysing later years when more and more individuals are treated becomes problematic, since it
is increasingly difficult to find suitable non-treated controls for the treated individuals.
20The share of individuals with capital income is fairly low in our data - see Table A1 in the
Appendix. This is mainly due to the fact that the sample excludes self-employed individuals (as they
were not part of the experiment). Note also that unlike in some other countries, interest income on
bank deposits is not part of income taxation and hence not included in our data (it is taxed at source
and not reported on the income tax return). Further, mortgage interest payments are not reported as
negative capital income, but rather as a deduction item. Finally, we have excluded individuals who
had reported capital gains from sales of local telecommunications company shares in 1997: this was a
one-off event associated with the privatization of the local telecommunications company in Helsinki,
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(iii) Wealth. Information on the amount of personal wealth was non-prefilled for
all taxpayers.
(iv) Prefilled deductions: This category consists of the mortgage interest deduc-
tion in 1997. Prior to 1997 no deduction items were prefilled, and prepopulation was
introduced for this single deduction item in 1997.
(v) Non-prefilled (discretionary) deductions: This category includes deductions for
the costs of travel to work, interest payments for mortgages (prior to 1997) and student
loans, costs for acquiring income and other smaller items.21
The prefilled income and deduction items were subject to third-party reporting in
both systems (regardless of whether the individual received a prepopulated return or
not), whereas the non-prefilled items were not subject to third party reporting in ei-
ther system. Third party reporting is naturally a prerequisite for using prepopulated
returns. However, since third party information affected all taxpayers in a similar fash-
ion, whereas we have variation in prepopulation across taxpayers, we can disentangle
the effects of prepopulation from those of third party information.22 Further, the fact
that individuals were told of their inclusion in the experiment only after the tax year
had ended, together with the fact that we are focussing on individuals who received a
prepopulated tax return for the first time, ensure that the responses that we observe
are only related to tax reporting, not to real behaviour.23
For income items, we use data on the self-reports. If there is no self-report, we
use the third-party report (i.e. the figure printed on the prefilled form; if there is no
separately recorded self-report, this implies that the individual has not amended the
proposal made by the tax authority in this respect, and hence accepts the prefilled
figure). The deduction data that we have on the other hand relates to approved
claims, and we have no separate information on original deduction claims. This has
both disadvantages and advantages. A disadvantage is clearly that we do not have
accurate information on the original claims. Nevertheless, approved claims should be
which caused a large local peak in the number of individuals with capital gains.
21In the Finnish system, there are a number of deductions / allowances that taxpayers receive auto-
matically (that are not reported at all on the income tax return), as well as a number of discretionary
deductions that they can apply for. The latter is similar to itemisation in the U.S. case. Itemisation
behaviour in the U.S. has been studied by Pitt and Slemrod (1989) and Slemrod (1989).
22This is in contrast to Gillitzer and Skov (2013) and Kleven et al. (2011), where the effects of
prepopulation and third party information cannot be separated. In Gillitzer and Skov, prepopulation
and third party reporting of charitable deductions were introduced simultaneously for the entire
population. In Kleven et al. there is no exogenous variation between individuals in either third party
information or prepopulation.
23For example, if opportunities for tax evasion change, this may trigger real behavioural responses,
as tax evasion opportunities have an effect on effective tax rates. However, due to the timing of the
experiment, this is not an issue in our case.
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a good proxy for original claims, as they should in the vast majority of cases be equal
to original claims (as individual tax returns are rarely audited). An advantage is that
the data that we have contains those figures that are relevant for the final outcome of
taxation (tax revenue, individual take-home pay).
To examine the effects of receiving a prefilled tax form on the above outcome
variables, we use a sample consisting of treated individuals and a control group (see
below), and estimate models of the following type:
yit = αi + γt + δDit + β
′Xit + εit,
where yit is the outcome variable of interest for individual i in year t. Dit is a dummy
variable indicating whether individual i received a prefilled tax form in year t and δ
is the effect on the outcome variable. We control for year dummies γt as well as for
individual fixed effects αi (through estimating the equation in first differences) and
time-varying individual characteristics Xit.
24 Finally, εit is the error term. In the
estimations, we cluster the standard errors by municipality.
Let us next turn to describe our identification strategy. Given the nature of the
rules that determined whether an individual will receive a prefilled income tax return
or not, and the fact that these rules varied both across individuals according to their
place of residence, as well as over time, we are able to identify the causal effect of the
method of income tax filing on taxpayers’ reporting behaviour. We will essentially use
a difference-in-difference methodology, where information on the selection rules is used
to form an appropriate control group for treated individuals. As was explained above,
individuals were selected into the experiment according to e.g. their income histories
and other characteristics. We form the control group by requiring that individuals
in the control group have these same characteristics: The sole reason why the control
individuals were not treated was that they lived in a different municipality that applied
some other selection model.25 It is also noteworthy that the selection criteria were not
known to taxpayers at the time, and therefore self-selection into the experiment is not
an issue.
We feel that the reform provides an unusually attractive set-up: Selection of indi-
viduals into the experiment was based on observables, and since we have information
on those observables, we can select the control group by those same criteria. As was
24We control for education (six categories), number of children (a dummy for each number), marital
status (four categories) and province of residence (20 provinces) in all regressions.
25More details of how we have constructed the control group are given in the Appendix.
16
explained in Section 3, the selection models were highly complex and in many cases
selection depended on previous year values of dozens of variables. We have information
on the vast majority of those variables, but we are for the moment missing a couple
of them.26 Nevertheless, with the information that we currently have, we can match
actual treatment with fairly high accuracy: 90,2% of individuals whom we predict to
have received a prefilled return, actually did so.
The identifying assumption is that the year-to-year changes in the outcome variable
for the treatment and control groups would have been similar in the absence of the
treatment. As usual in a difference-in-difference set-up, we can provide support for
this assumption through examining the pre-treatment changes (and associated pseudo-
tests) in the outcome variable in the two groups. Further, we also exploit the panel
nature of the data and control for individual fixed effects. Hence the effects that we
estimate are identified from within-person variation. The effects that we identify with
this procedure are average treatment effects on the treated.27
5 Results
Income items We first turn to results regarding positive income items on the tax
return. We discuss results for prefilled and non-prefilled items separately.
First, let us examine effects on reported income from primary and secondary jobs.
These income items were prefilled for those who received the prepopulated tax return.
For these items, we do not expect to find large effects on reporting, as they were subject
to third party reporting in both systems. Further, these items were also subject to
income tax withholding, and hence taxpayers must have been well aware that their
income from these sources is known to the tax authority, regardless of whether this
information was prefilled or not.28 There is nothing to gain from understating one’s
income on these items, nor can one plausibly forget about it.
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the effect on the fraction of individuals reporting
any income from primary and secondary jobs, whereas column (2) reports the effect
26Even though we have access to the contents of the entire tax register, some variables were not
saved in that register. We are currently in the process of determining whether this information can
be obtained from other registers.
27Especially in the first year of the experiment, the participants were a highly selective group (e.g.
pensioners, low income individuals). To arrive at population average treatment effects (in future
work), we will need to use a weighting procedure.
28E.g. Slemrod and Gillitzer (2014, 43) note that reports by the U.S. Department of the Treasury
indicate that evasion rates on items subject to both third-party reporting and witholding are very
low, 1%.
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on the average amounts reported (in the Finnish currency Markka, FIM). Indeed we
find no effects on these items. The distributions of earned income from primary and
secondary jobs for the treatment and the control group are presented in Figure 1.29
The figure shows that the distributions were very similar in the treatment and control
group, both before and after the reform.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Second, we look at effects on other earned income and capital income. These items
were not prefilled in the income tax return even for those individuals who received a
prepopulated return. The results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. We
find that receiving a partially prefilled income tax return caused a small but significant
drop - amounting to 1,3 %-points - in the fraction of individuals with any income on
these items. While the effect is not large, it is non-negligible in relative terms: only
9,4 % of individuals in the treatment group had some income in these categories prior
to the reform, so the reform reduced the fraction of people with income on these items
by approximately 1/7.
However, in monetary terms the effect on non-prefilled income items (column (4)
of Table 2) was not significant. The main reason is that it was those individuals with
only small amounts of income on these items that stopped reporting. This can be seen
in Figure 2, where we present the histograms of the amounts of non-prefilled income
for individuals in the treatment and control groups, both before and after the reform.
The number of individuals with income on these items appears somewhat higher in
the control group before the reform. After the reform, the number of individuals with
small (but positive) amounts of income in these categories declined in the treatment
group, whereas it increased in the control group. Formal analyses confirm the visual
observation that the reform caused a significant reduction in frequencies at the low
end of the distribution, but that there was no such reduction in frequencies for higher
levels of income. We estimated models in which the dependent variable was a dummy
indicating reported income on the relevant items larger than some amount K. The
p-value of the treatment effect falls below 0.05 as K is increased to approximately FIM
1000.
[Figure 2 about here.]
29In Figures 1-4, we present the entire distribution of the relevant items on the tax return, excluding
zeroes and the top 5% (to make changes elsewhere more easily detectable).
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Table 2. Effect of receiving a prefilled tax return on reporting behaviour: income items.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
prefilled income prefilled income Non-prefilled income Non-prefilled income
(dummy) (FIM) (dummy) (FIM)
prefilled return 0.0018 304.8 . -0.0134** -19.31
(0.0017) (317.5) (0.0043) (103.32)
relative effect -14 %
N 375,998 375,998 373,655 373,655
Robust and clustered (municipality) standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include individual controls and fixed effects.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Deductions Let us next turn to deduction claims, focussing first on those deduction
items that were prefilled for those who received the prepopulated return. At the start
of the policy experiment, none of the deductions were prefilled. However, in 1997,
prefilling was introduced for the mortgage interest deduction. In columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3, we report the effect of receiving a prefilled income tax return (for the
first time) in 1997, on mortgage interest deduction claims. In column (1), we find
an approximately 5%-point increase in the proportion of individuals claiming for the
mortgage interest deduction. This increase amounts to almost 1/4 more claims relative
to the previous year, when 21,5 % of individuals in the treatment group claimed for the
mortgage interest deduction. The setting here is similar to Gillitzer and Skov (2013),
who analyse the effect of the prefilling of the charitable tax deduction in Denmark, and
find a large positive effect on the number of claims.
However, there was no effect on the average magnitude of claims (column (2) of
Table 3). Again, this is explained by the finding that the new claims were small in
magnitude. The histograms of mortgage interest deduction claims for the treatment
and control groups, before and after the reform, are shown in Figure 3. Mortgage
interest deduction claims increased in both groups in 1997, but more so in the treatment
group, especially for low claims. Again, using a similar methodology as above, we find
that differences in the changes in claims between the treatment and the control group
are significant only at the low end of the distribution, for claims less than approximately
FIM 6000.
[Figure 3 about here.]
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Finally, let us turn to results regarding claims for non-prefilled deduction items. In
column (3) of Table 3, the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the individual
claimed for any of such deductions.30 The results indicate that receiving a prefilled
return reduced the fraction of individuals claiming for non-prefilled deductions by 12.6
%-points. This is a fairly large effect: in the year preceding their inclusion into the
experiment, approximately 44 % of the individuals in our treatment group filed for these
deductions. Receiving a prefilled return therefore reduced the number of individuals
claiming for deductions by over 1/4 relative to the previous year.
Column (4) of Table 3 shows the effect on the amount of non-prefilled deductions
that individuals filed for on average. The dependent variable is now the total sum of
money associated with all relevant items on the tax return. The amount of deductions
filed for decreased on average by about FIM 470, which corresponds to about e 138
in 2013 (deflated by the average earnings index). This reduction reflects the fact that
the fraction of zeros increased, as we showed above.
Table 3. Effect of receiving a prefilled tax return on reporting behaviour: deductions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
prefilled prefilled Non-prefilled Non-prefilled
deductions deductions deductions deductions
(dummy) (FIM) (dummy) (FIM)
prefilled return 0.0513** -27.87 -0.1255** -469.10**
(0.0098) (98.41) (0.0088) (129.76)
relative effect -24 % -29 % -13 %
N 375,998 375,998 375,998 375,998
Robust and clustered (municipality) standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include individual controls and fixed effects.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
It is interesting to note, however, that the average amount of deductions (condi-
tional on claiming a positive amount) increased by an extra FIM 1,292 in the treatment
group compared to the recipients of the conventional return. (Note that this figure in-
corporates both the change in the composition of the group claiming for deductions,
and changes in the claimed amounts.) In Figure 4, we take a closer look at the changes
in the distribution of non-prefilled deduction claims. In the treatment group there was
30That is, this dummy equals 0 if all items associated with non-pre-filled deductions in the individ-
ual’s tax return were zero; and 1 otherwise.
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a significant drop in frequencies at low deductions. In the control group, on the other
hand, there was a much smaller or no drop. Again, formal analyses confirm the visual
observation that the reform caused a significant drop in frequencies at low deductions,
but that there was no such drop in frequencies at high deductions: The estimated
treatment effect becomes insignificant for deductions claims above FIM 7,000.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Wealth At the time of the reform, wealth was taxable in Finland, if the amount of
wealth exceeded FIM 1 100 000 (this was roughly equivalent to 254 000 e in 2014).
Wealth taxation was based solely on self-reports, and it was therefore another non-
prefilled item on the tax return. We find that receiving a partially prefilled income tax
return caused a highly statistically significant decline in both the number of individuals
reporting a positive amount of wealth, as well as in the average amount of wealth
reported. The results are reported in Table 4. The result is analogous to the finding
that there was a reduction in non-prefilled income. Figure 5 shows that the effect comes
from a very large reduction in reporting at the low end of the wealth distribution.
Table 4. Effect of receiving a prefilled tax return




prefilled return -0.0341** -3285.25**
(0.0025) (832.14)
relative effect -6,6 % -4,3 %
N 375,998 375,998
Robust and clustered (municipality) standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include individual controls and fixed effects.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
[Figure 5 about here]
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Total taxable income and taxes paid Finally, we have estimated the effect of
receiving a prefilled tax return on individuals’ total taxable income and taxes paid.
Figures 6 and 7 show the distributions of total taxable income and taxes paid in
the treatment and control group before and after the reform. Regression results are
reported in Table 5. The results indicate the introduction of prefilled tax returns had
no effect on these aggregate measures.31
Table 5. Effect of receiving a prefilled tax return
on reporting behaviour: aggregates.
(1) (2)
total taxable income total taxes paid
(FIM) (FIM)
prefilled return 323.57 43.44
(284.53) (170.57)
N 375,998 375,998
Robust and clustered (municipality) standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include individual controls and fixed effects.
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
[Figures 6 and 7 about here.]
These results are significant for an overall evaluation of the reform. To the extent
that taxable income is a sufficient statistic for welfare, the results would imply that
prefilled tax returns appear to be a good idea: the reform implied no adverse effects
on taxable income, but at the same time it resulted in a more efficient use of infor-
mation available to the tax authority and therefore reduced the costs of tax filing and
administration.
This conclusion could potentially be qualified if the reform had adverse effects on
the income distribution. It is therefore also important to consider whether the effects
of the reform differed across income groups? Did the reform imply significant losses
for any income group? While we have not yet analysed the effects on the income
distribution in detail, preliminary analyses suggest that total taxable income or total
taxes paid did not change significantly in any income group.
31It should be noted that that the effects reported in all the tables are average treatment effects on
the treated. To obtain population effects - such as effects on total tax revenue - one needs to obtain
weighted estimates (in progress).
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Placebo tests Finally, to provide support for our identifying assumption, we have
also examined a pseudo-treatment corresponding to each of the specifications in Tables
2 to 5, where we pretend that the individuals in the treatment group received a prefilled
return one year earlier than they actually did. The estimated effects of the pseudo-
treatment are reported in Table A2 in Appendix 2. The estimated effects are small
and far from being statistically significant in all of the 12 cases. These tests provide
very convincing support for our set-up.
6 Discussion
Let us next turn back to the theoretical arguments on why the details of the tax
filing system might affect reporting behaviour, and to a discussion of which of the
explanations outlined in Section 2 are most likely to be the driving forces behind our
results.
Let us first turn to the third possible explanation, namely changes in the opportu-
nities for tax evasion. In Section 2, we outlined two possibilities as to how receiving
a prepopulated return might affect the perceived probability of detection. It is imme-
diately clear that if the perceived probabilities were as in (8), a story relating to the
possibilities for tax evasion would not be consistent with our findings: in this case
we should observe an increase in evasion on non-prefilled items. However, our most
prominent finding is the large reduction in claiming for non-prefilled deductions, which
would be consistent with less, not more evasion.
On the other hand, if perceived probabilities of detection were as in (7), a story
related to the opportunities for tax evasion would in principle be consistent with a
reduction in non-prefilled deductions. However, for this type of a story, it would be
a puzzle why we see a disappearance of small deductions, as an auditor’s attention
would most likely be drawn to exceptionally large deduction claims. Further, if (7)
holds, receiving a prefilled return should cause a reduction in evasion across the board.
We observed both increases in reported net income (the large decline in non-prefilled
deductions) on some items, as well as reductions in reported net income on other items
(a reduction in non-prefilled income and an increase in prefilled deductions). There-
fore, while we of course cannot rule out the possibility that tax evasion opportunities
would have been significant in determining the responses of some individuals, the above
findings suggest that arguments related to tax evasion opportunities clearly cannot be
the whole story.
Turning next to explanations related to complexity and the costs of reporting, all
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our results are in line with this story. Broadly speaking, we find an increase in the
tendency to report whatever is prefilled on the tax return, and a reduction in the
tendency to report those items that are not prefilled. The large reduction in claiming
non-prefilled deductions is consistent with individuals having a fixed complexity cost
of tax filing: Many individuals who received a prefilled return decided not to file, as
by doing so they could choose to avoid the fixed complexity cost of filing. Avoiding
the fixed cost was not an option for individuals who were required to file a complete
return. Further, an important feature of our results is that the effects that we observe
occur predominantly through effects on the number of individuals claiming for small
deductions: for those individuals, the costs of filing exceeded the (expected) benefits.
A similar reasoning would explain the reduction in the number of individuals reporting
any non-prefilled income: it may be, for instance, that individuals are willing to tolerate
the risk of getting caught with tax evasion (i.e. leaving small amounts of income
unreported) if they can avoid the fixed cost of filing a return.
The fact that there was an increase in the number of individuals claiming for de-
ductions that were actually prefilled is also compatible with a story related to costs of
reporting. (Note that the relevant cost here, however, is a variable cost of filing for
any single item, rather than a fixed cost of filing in general.)
A part of the explanation for our findings may also be related to salience effects.
This is in particular the case regarding non-prefilled items, where the fraction of zeros
increased for both positive income items and deductions. However, the fact that we
see responses predominantly at the low end of the distribution (of deductions and
non-prefilled income) points more towards individuals conducting a rational calculus
between benefits and costs of reporting, rather than towards purely accidental omissions
in reporting.
A final point to discuss is to what extent our results are likely to extend to countries
implementing prefilled tax returns today. First, the details of filing systems may differ
across countries and over time. For example, during the time when the reform was im-
plemented in Finland, paper filing was used, whereas electronic filing is now becoming
increasingly common. Are the complexity costs of filing taxes likely to be very different
today? To the extent that complexity costs arise from the need to study information
materials and from having to learn the details of the tax system, we conjecture that
those costs have not radically declined over time. Second, the generalisability of our
results may to some extent depend on the similarity of some features of tax systems
(e.g. deductions) across countries. The Finnish tax system is certainly very similar
to tax systems in other Scandinavian countries, but it is also interesting to note for
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example that the Finnish and the U.S. tax systems are surprisingly similar in this
respect.
Finally, regardless of the details of particular tax systems, our analysis implies
that the information available to taxpayers is likely to have important effects for the
success of a reform introducing prefilled tax returns: tax authorities should take care
in ensuring that taxpayers have adequate information on their obligations to report
certain non-prefilled items, as well as their eligibility for discretionary deductions. To
the extent that omissions in reporting non-prefilled items were due to complexity costs,
the results also point towards the adverse effects of tax complexity on compliance.
7 Conclusions
Prefilled income tax returns are used in many countries, and their use has been planned
and/or experimented with in others. Yet no systematic evidence on their effects exist.
It is clear that prefilled returns reduce administrative costs for the tax authority, as
well as compliance costs for taxpayers, but their effects on reporting behaviour have
been unexplored to date.
We utilised a Finnish policy experiment to study the effects of prefilled income tax
returns on reporting behaviour. We find that receiving a partially prefilled income tax
return increased taxpayers’ tendency to report deduction items that are prefilled on the
tax return, and reduced the tendency to report both income and deduction items that
are not prefilled. We discussed three possible explanations for our findings - changes
in tax evasion opportunities, salience effects, and compliance costs, which we argue
mainly result from the complexity of tax filing and the tax system in general. We
argued that while some of our findings are consistent with the first two explanations,
the overall pattern of responses is best explained by complexity costs.
Our results, in particular those related to the large effects on deduction claims,
provide interesting information on taxpayers’ behaviour, as they indicate that relatively
minor changes in the tax system may have fairly large effects on (reporting) behaviour.
The results therefore point towards the need for a better understanding of various
design features of tax systems that have until recently received relatively little attention
in the literature (see e.g. Slemrod and Gillitzer 2014).
We also find that receiving a prefilled tax return had no effect on individuals’ total
taxable income and taxes paid. These results are significant for an overall evaluation
of the reform. To the extent that taxable income is a sufficient statistic for welfare, the
results coupled with the savings in administrative costs associated with prefilled tax
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returns, point towards the conclusion that prefilled tax returns appear to be a good idea.
However, it has to be borne in mind that there may be large effects on reporting some
particular items, and even though the effects on various types of income and deduction
items cancel each other out in our particular case, this may not hold in general. The
precise way in which a reform introducing prefilled tax forms is implemented may
therefore be important for the success of the policy, and our findings also provide
useful information for tax authorities planning to implement prefilled tax returns. For
example, tax authorities should take care in ensuring that taxpayers have adequate
information on their obligations to report certain non-prefilled items, as well as their
eligibility for discretionary deductions. The results also point towards the adverse
effects of tax complexity on compliance.
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Appendix 1. Selecting the control group
We form the control group as follows: For each treated individual, we find a control
individual by applying exactly the same criteria that caused the treated individual to
be included in the experiment, but who was not treated because she lived in another
municipality that either did not participate in the experiment, or used a different se-
lection model. In selecting the control group for individuals living in, say, municipality
A, from individuals living in another municipality B, we take into account the selection
models used in both municipalities. The examples below clarify the procedure.
For example, assume that an individual living in municipality A, using selection
model 1 (e.g. selecting pensioners only), was selected into the experiment. Consider
another individual living in municipality B, who also fulfils the criteria of model 1 (i.e.
is a pensioner), but was not selected into the experiment because his municipality did
not participate. This individual in municipality B can now serve as a control for the
treated individual in municipality A.
A more general case is the one where municipality B also participated in the ex-
periment but used a different set of selection criteria than municipality A. In this case,
when selecting a control from municipality B, we also utilise the selection criteria that
were applied in municipality B: e.g. if municipality B used a model that selected low-
income individuals only, we use untreated individuals in municipality B as potential
controls only for high-income individuals in other municipalities.
Further, in later years of the experiment (1996->), we also require that the control
individuals not only satisfy the same selection (or exclusion) criteria as the treated
individual for that year, but also for the previous years of the experiment. For example,
assume that an individual lives in a municipality where only pensioners were treated
in 1995, and we observe that the individual is treated for the first time in 1996. We
then use the selection criteria for 1996 to find a control for this individual, as explained
above, but further restrict the pool of eligible controls to individuals who were non-
pensioners in 1995.
Note that there are in general many individuals who could serve as a control for
any treated individual (i.e. who fulfil the selection criteria in the way defined above).
We select one control individual for each treated individual randomly from this pool of
eligible controls. Using all eligible controls would lead to an unbalanced sample, in the
sense that there are more eligible controls for some treated individuals than for others.
Hence using a sample where all eligible controls are included might lead to a situation
where the fractions of, say, employed and unemployed individuals differ between the
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treatment and the control group, and therefore to biased results.
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Appendix 2. Additional tables
Table A1. Descriptive statistics.
Treatment group Control group
mean sd mean sd
Prefilled income 62254 79435 56020 71024
Share 0.6284 0.4832 0.6181 0.4858
Non-prefilled income 1284 21424 1561 25760
Share 0.0956 0.2940 0.1258 0.3316
Prefilled deductions 3403 11155 3256 6389
....Share 0.4740 0.4993 0.4339 0.4956
Non-prefilled deductions 2806 9401 2969 8864
Share 0.3540 0.4782 0.4059 0.4910
Age 44.485 17.991 44.635 18.111
Male 0.4715 0.4991 0.4859 0.4998
Education category 1 0.4112 0.4920 0.4262 0.4945
category 2 0.3690 0.4825 0.3805 0.4855
category 3 0.1210 0.3262 0.1151 0.3191
category 4 0.0448 0.2068 0.0395 0.1948
category 5 0.0496 0.2172 0.0354 0.1849
category 6 0.0041 0.0645 0.0030 0.0547
Number of children 0.4586 0.9116 0.4725 0.9358
Single 0.5600 0.4963 0.5348 0.4987
Married 0.4308 0.4951 0.4572 0.4981
Divorced 0.0059 0.0768 0.0060 0.0774
Widow 0.0032 0.0567 0.0018 0.0427
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the treatment year and the
previous year.
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Table A2. Effects of pseudo-treatment on income items and deductions.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
prefilled income prefilled income Non-prefilled income Non-prefilled income
(dummy) (FIM) (dummy) (FIM)
prefilled return 0.0021 317.188 . -0.0024 72.11
(0.0025) (377.5) (0.0017) (106.40)
N 375,998 375,998 373,640 373,640
(5) (6) (7) (8)
prefilled deductions prefilled deductions Non-prefilled deductions Non-prefilled deductions
(dummy) (FIM) (dummy) (FIM)
prefilled return 0.0012 -25.48 -0.0061 -62.46
(0.0022) (81.98) (0.0109) (47.94)
N 375,998 375,998 375,998 375,998
(9) (10) (11) (12)
wealth (dummy) wealth (FIM) taxable income (FIM) total taxes paid (FIM)
prefilled return 0.0007 387.27 373,52 179.87
(0.0012) (304.48) (315,60) (125.46)
N 375,998 375,998 375,998 375,998
Robust and clustered (municipality) standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include individual controls and fixed effects.
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Figure 1. Distribution of earned income from primary and secondary jobs before (white) and after (green) 
the reform, in treatment group (top panel) and control group (bottom panel).  
  
Figure 2. Distribution of other earned income and capital income before (white) and after (green) the reform, 
in treatment group (top panel) and control group (bottom panel). 
  
Figure 3. Distribution of mortgage interest deduction before (white) and after (green) the reform, in 
treatment group (top panel) and control group (bottom panel). 
  
Figure 4. Distribution of discretionary deductions before (white) and after (green) the reform, in treatment 
group (top panel) and control group (bottom panel). 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of reported wealth before (white) and after (green) the reform, in treatment group 
(top panel) and control group (bottom panel). 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of taxable income before (white) and after (green) the reform, in treatment group (top 
panel) and control group (bottom panel). 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of total taxes paid before (white) and after (green) the reform, in treatment group (top 
panel) and control group (bottom panel). 
